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Background. Experimental results evidenced the infectious potential of the dental pulp of animals infected with transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies (TSE). This route of iatrogenic transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) may
exist in humans via reused endodontic instruments if inadequate prion decontamination procedures are used. Methodology/
Principal Findings. To assess this risk, 10 critical parameters in the transmission process were identified, starting with
contamination of an endodontic file during treatment of an infectious sCJD patient and ending with possible infection of a
subsequent susceptible patient. It was assumed that a dose-risk response existed, with no-risk below threshold values.
Plausible ranges of those parameters were obtained through literature search and expert opinions, and a sensitivity analysis
was conducted. Without effective prion-deactivation procedures, the risk of being infected during endodontic treatment
ranged between 3.4 and 13 per million procedures. The probability that more than one case was infected secondary to
endodontic treatment of an infected sCJD patient ranged from 47% to 77% depending on the assumed quantity of infective
material necessary for disease transmission. If current official recommendations on endodontic instrument decontamination
were strictly followed, the risk of secondary infection would become quasi-null. Conclusion. The risk of sCJD transmission
through endodontic procedure compares with other health care risks of current concern such as death after liver biopsy or
during general anaesthesia. These results show that single instrument use or adequate prion-decontamination procedures like
those recently implemented in dental practice must be rigorously enforced.
Citation: Bourvis N, Boelle P-Y, Cesbron J-Y, Valleron A-J (2007) Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic
Practice in Absence of Adequate Prion Inactivation. PLoS ONE 2(12): e1330. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001330
INTRODUCTION
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD) was first described in the
1920s[1]. This rare neurodegenerative disease classically starts as
a progressive dementia and leads to death within 6 months. The
clinical diagnosis must be confirmed by histological analysis of the
brain. There are four categories of CJD: 1) familial (fCJD) has a
very low incidence of 1610
27/year; 2) sporadic (sCJD) has an
incidence in the range of 1–2610
26/year; 3) new variant (nvCJD)
caused by the agent of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE) and discovered in 1996[2]; and 4) iatrogenic (iCJD).
The first documented iCJD case, reported in 1977, was caused
by the reuse of contaminated neurosurgery instruments[3]. Since
then, 267 iCJD cases have been ascertained, following human
growth hormone (hGH) injection, dura mater grafts, corneal
transplants, neurosurgery, gonadotropin administration, and
stereotactic EEG[4]. The last EuroCJD report [5] summarized
CJD surveillance in 11 European countries over a mean duration
of 14.4 years and reported 195 iCJD cases (out of a total of 6962
CJD cases), among which 143 were caused by hGH injection and
the rest by dura mater grafts (n=50) and corneal transplants
(n=2). The cases reported as iatrogenic in the surveillance systems
were only those for which the route of transmission could be
confirmed. Thus, it cannot be excluded that other iCJD cases
could go unnoticed and be reported as sCJD. Several case–control
studies investigated this possibility and a positive association
between the total number of surgical interventions undergone and
the risk of developing sCJD was found in several instances [6–8].
Although no specific procedures could be identified, those
epidemiological findings strongly suggest that iatrogenic transmis-
sion of CJD may be, or may have been, much more widespread
than currently seen in surveillance systems. This possibility is
further supported by several pieces of evidence. First, tissue
infectivity–or the ability of the sCJD pathogen in a tissue to cause
infection–is not restricted to the central nervous system. Recently,
the pathological form of the prion protein (PrP
sc) was found in the
spleen and skeletal muscles of sCJD patients [9] and their olfactory
epithelium [10]. In sCJD-infected primates, a broad range of
tissues, including peripheral nerves, was shown to harbour PrP
sc at
levels higher than previously considered [11]. Thus, the number of
procedures that can be considered at risk of TSE transmission is
much higher than previously thought. The individual risk
associated with these procedures may be low, but if these are
performed on millions of patients the iatrogenic transmission may
become of concern. Second, the existence of an infective state
before symptoms appear is suggested by animal experiments [12–
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is available, detecting infectious carriers is impossible. Therefore,
the numbers of potentially infectious subjects who may be
infectious could be much higher than the figures of CJD incidence
indicate. Third, decontamination procedures routinely used in the
past were ineffective against the CJD agent [16]. Although
autoclaving is effective for prion decontamination [17], the level of
compliance with such practice in healthcare settings is unknown.
For all these reasons, it is not implausible that individuals were
contaminated in the past, and could continue to be so if the proper
decontamination procedures are not carried out and instruments
reused. The low incidence and very long incubation period of CJD
impairs the chance of a direct observation of these risks. Should
observation be possible, it might occur at a time when it would be
too late to efficiently intervene. Even if one chose to wait another
dozen years to carry out a case control study, there is no guarantee
that the risk could be identified if exposure is excessively common
and experienced by virtually everybody over time. Furthermore,
negative case control studies may not rule out the existence of a
risk. A recent paper studying the risk of sCJD transmission through
ophthalmic surgery makes this point clearly: a well designed case-
control study did not evidence a significant increase of the risk of
CJD after surgery, yet the conclusion insists on reinforcing proper
decontamination procedures[18].
Finally, iCJD risk assessment poses a practical challenge for
public health. Experts may be asked about the existence and
potential magnitude of the risk. However, this derivation follows a
‘‘black box’’ approach. Mathematical modelling is the only
scientific method to answer the question because it forces to state
the different components contributing to the risk, to gather all
available knowledge on these components, and to explicitly
describe how the risk is computed.
Herein, we report our assessment of iatrogenic transmission of
CJD during endodontic treatment (ET). Several characteristics
explain the choice of this procedure for iCJD risk assessment. First,
ET involves contacts with the richly innervated dental pulp, a
tissue whose infectivity was demonstrated in animal models
(intraperitoneal injection in hamsters) [19]. The intradental route
of inoculation was also shown to efficiently transmit the disease
[19]. It must however be stressed that no evidence supports the
presence of PrP
sc in the dental pulp of sCJD patients. It was
reportedly absent in patients who died of sCJD, but the minute
amount of material available and insensitivity of the assays
considerably limited the conclusiveness of those findings [20],
while raising a lot of suspicion. Second, ET instruments are
reused by the vast majority of practitioners [21]. They are known
to be particularly difficult to clean and decontaminate because of
their small size and complex surface structure, and, indeed,
residues of proteic material are visible on most instruments after
usual cleaning procedures [21]. Third, the frequency of exposure
to ET is very high, in the order of 1 procedure/10 persons/year
[22,23]. This is a typical example of a procedure that virtually
everybody in a population has experienced, which impairs any
hope to get a risk assessment with a case-control study, would it be
in decades.
In this study we provide an estimate of the iatrogenic risk of
sCJD transmission in current and past endodontic practice,
assuming that prion infectivity of dental pulp is real. We estimated
whether–in the absence of effective decontamination procedures,
as was the case during most of the 20
th century–these hypothetical
transmissions could have put patients at risk, and whether that risk
is sufficiently high to have initiated a small an epidemic process,
defined as a process in which the secondary number of infected
cases is larger than 1.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Description of ET and model implication
In ET, also called root canal treatment, the infected dental pulp is
removed and then replaced by a filler. Before beginning the
procedure, a rubber sheet, called a rubber dam, is stretched
around the tooth and is held in place by a small clamp. Then, the
pulp is accessed by drilling through the tooth into the pulp
chamber. Most of the cleaning process is then accomplished with
root-canal files or reamers. These have the structure of a screw
(25 mm long, 0.08–0.8 mm diameter), with a spiral cutting edge
on the surface. A series of these instruments, each with a slightly
larger diameter, are used during the treatment, being bumped up
and down, and with a simultaneous twisting motion, so as to
scrape out and reshape the root canal. This action is traditionally
performed manually; however, special dental drills can also be
used. Once the tooth has been thoroughly cleansed, the canal is
filled, most commonly with a rubber compound (gutta-percha)
usually in conjunction with a sealer paste. These are inserted into
the newly cleansed and reshaped root canal with a dental drill.
Finally, the hole in the tooth created at the beginning of the
procedure is also filled.
Risk of sCJD transmission associated with
instrument reuse
We postulated here that CJD transmission could be mediated by the
reuse of endodontic instruments, because they are typically reused. If
such an instrument were to be used on a new patient after having
been used inanasymptomaticinfectiouspatient,and ifthe cleaning/
autoclaving of the instrument had not been 100% effective, a risk of
transmission wouldexist. Figure 1 describes the typical patternof ET
instruments use in the treatment of an infectious sCJD patient, and
the natural history of CJD transmission.
Endpoints of the risk assessment
We quantified the risk of CJD transmission during ET from an
individual and population perspectives. For the former, we
estimated the risk for a patient of becoming infected during a
root-canal treatment. For the latter, we quantified the population
risk by the mean number of secondary cases after treatment of an
infectious CJD patient (SC), the so called reproduction rate of the
transmission process (denoted R).
The risk of transmission model
The risk assessment of transmission depends upon the ten
parameters listed in Table 1. The computation of the risk was
carried out in five steps.
The load L, i.e., the 50% infectivity dose (ID50) remaining on an
instrument after use in an infectious sCJD patient, cleaning and
autoclaving (parameters 1–4, table 1) is given by the equation:
L~BI|BPR|M|AIR:
The infectivity load, IL, that is the real dose inoculated into a
patient treated with a contaminated instrument bearing a load L is
given by: IL=L6FM (parameter 5, table 1). After inoculation, the
probability of infection for this patient is given by a dose response
function Q. A meta-analysis of experimental data on scrapie
indicated that the dose–response curve for TSE was S-shaped
[24]. We therefore selected two dose–response functions for use in
the model: Q1 is 0 below 10
21 ID50, linear on the log10 scale
between 10
21 and 10
1 ID50, and 1 above; while Q2 is 0 below 10
22
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22 and 10
2 ID50
and 1 above.
The estimation of the number of secondary cases (SC) depends
on the number N of instruments used per procedure and on the
infectivity load remaining on those instruments after each reuse.
We assumed that the maximum number of times any of the N
instruments is used in the treatment of an infectious sCJD patient
was U. The number of reuses of a contaminated instrument may
therefore range from 0 if the instrument was not used after the
sCJD patient, to U–1 if it was first used on the sCJD patient. We
assumed that, for a patient undergoing ET, an instrument would
have been previously used u times with u uniform on the set {0,
1,..., U–1}. Then, according to steps 1 and 2, the average number
of secondary cases SC contaminated by the initial procedure in the
CJD patient is:
SC~
X N
k~1
X uk
l~1
Q(ILk,l)
where uk is the number of reuses of the k
th instrument, and ILk,l the
real dose inoculated from the k
th instrument on its l
th reuse. The
latter was calculated as:
ILk,l~Lk|FMk,l| P
l{1
j~1
1{FMk,j
  
where Lk is the initial load of the k
th instrument, and 1-FM k,j is the
fraction of infectivity load lost by the k
th instrument during its l
th
reuse.
The risk of sCJD transmission was estimated considering the
two exclusive possibilities that a given instrument does not
contaminate during ET: either the instrument was never exposed
to an infectious patient, or the instrument was exposed to an
infectious sCJD patient, but infection failed to occur during this
particular contact because the inoculum was too small. Taking
both possibilities into account, the probability p of not being
infected by an instrument during an ET was given by:
p~
1
U
1z
X R{1
u~1
1{PCJD ðÞ
uzPCJD
X u
j~1
1{Q(ILj)
  
| 1{PCJD ðÞ
j{1
 ! "#
,
or :
p&1zPCJD
U{1
2
{PCJD
X U{1
j~1
Q(ILj)| 1{
j
U
  
where PCJD is the (small) probability that a patient is incubating
sCJD, u is the number of times the instrument was used prior to
the patient, and Ij is the infectivity load transferred from an
instrument contaminated j uses earlier. The probability to be
infected by one of the N instruments used in one procedure is
12p
N. Taking into account that PCJD is small, we derived
1{pN&NPCJD
U{1
2
{NPCJD
X U{1
j~1
U{j
U
Q ILj
  
.
This formula takes into account that a typical instrument has
been used
U{1
2
times before the patient, therefore the pro-
bability that at least one instrument was infected is approximately
N|PCJD|
U{1
2
where PCJD is the prevalence of infectious CJD
cases in the population.
The cumulated number of secondary cases over the infectious
lifetime of a sCJD patient is the reproduction number of the ET
transmission, and is given by R=SC6ETGP6DI, where SC is the
number of secondary cases following an ET episode calculated
above, ETGP is the frequency of ET and DI is the duration of the
infectious period. The incidence, IGP, i.e. the number of newly
infected person per year, is given by:
IGP~SC|ETGP|PCJD:
Uncertainty analysis
All the parameters used in the risk assessment were given plausible
ranges (Table 1).
Figure 1. Pattern of use of ET instruments and natural history of sCJD
transmission. a–In this example of ET, 6 files were used in an infectious
sCJD patient. The history of each file is represented horizontally from
left to right. At the time of ET (N), the total number of future reuses
varies from one instrument to the other (here between 8 and 10). For
example, instrument 4 was used for the first time on the infectious sCJD
patient, and will be reused 9 times in subsequent patients. In contrast,
instrument 6 is never reused after being contaminated. b–Flow chart of
sCJD transmission and natural history in our model. The sCJD
incubation period is divided into three phases: I, the infected individual
is neither infectious nor symptomatic, II, the patient becomes infectious,
but remains asymptomatic: this is the only period when iatrogenic
transmission is possible. III, the patient is symptomatic and CJD has
been diagnosed so that the patient MUST be treated with single-use
instruments and will not infect others.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001330.g001
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computations of the model endpoints, each time with a set of
parameters sampled in a rectangular distribution within the
proposed ranges.
RESULTS
There was a non zero risk of being infected with sCJD during ET
under all hypotheses of dose–effect relationship. With Q1, the
estimate of the mean individual risk was 2.8/100,000 (95% CI:
0.34/100,000–7.5/100,000), with Q2 it was 5.6/100,000 (95% CI:
0.86/100,000–14/100,000). The ranges of uncertainty were large
(Figure 2) reflecting those of the model parameters.
The basic reproduction rate R was also estimated (Figure 3). We
decided to express the likelihood of the epidemic potential of ET
with the dose–effect functions Q1 and Q2, using the percentages of
cases when R.1. These proportions were found respectively equal
to 47% and 77%. Ranges of possible values for R were broad
(respective 95% CI of 0–12.9 and 0.14–17.3).
The model was also used to estimate the median number of
secondary infections that could result from a single endodontic
treatment that would be performed in an infectious sCJD patient.
With dose-response functions Q1 this is 0.86 (95% CI of 0–10.8)
and 4.1 (95% CI of 0.24–13.9) with Q2.
Finally, all computations were repeated, assuming that auto-
claving was extensively used in dental practice and effective at
decontamination. The estimates were virtually equal to zero in all
instances. With Q1 and Q2, the means of individual risks were
4.6610
216 and 2.0610
210 and the respective annual incidences of
secondary cases were 4.6610
217 and 1.2 10
211.
DISCUSSION
The results of this modelling approach show that the risk of sCJD
transmission due to the reuse of instruments during ET may not be
ignored in absence of effective prion-decontamination procedures.
How should our conclusions be used in a public health
assessment? First note that this risk is already of concern to
national health agencies as well as to health professionals [25–27].
Our work makes it possible to go beyond a qualitative assessment,
towards more quantitative predictions where all hypotheses are
clearly stated. The conclusions of this approach may easily be
updated as new data accrue.
The details of ET were obtained from the latest official reports
in France and UK or from experts. We conducted a literature
search to collect the best estimates available of the possible
quantities of infectious material left on the instruments, and
subsequently partially removed by the classical disinfection
procedures used until the last years of the 20
th century. We
obtained similarly estimates of the values of brain infectivity and of
the ratio of brain infectivity to pulp infectivity. These parameters
were obtained from animal experiments as they are clearly
unknown in humans.
A comparable approach can be found in the HPA report on
vCJD transmission in dentistry with two notable differences [25].
First, the route of instrument contamination and subsequent
transmission considered in the HPA report was a very rare
accidental process: the abrasion of tonsillar tissue during dental
care. On the contrary, we considered the process of accessing the
dental pulp during ET as certain, which obviously leads to a
higher risk. Second, the HPA report considered infectivity of
tonsils to be 10
6–10
7 i/c ID50 per gram, while we used dental pulp
with a slightly lower range of infectivity from 10
4-10
6i/c ID50 per
gram (=BI* BPR).
The hypotheses we used concerning the relationship between
the estimated inoculums and the probability of infection are
obviously critical. In our assessment, we postulated that too small
an inoculum (below 10
21 and 10
22 ID50 were considered with
functions Q1 and Q2) would not lead to infection, and that there
was a linear dose–response relationship above this threshold. This
effectively complies with the ‘‘zero risk below a threshold’’
hypothesis rather than with the ‘‘single infectious particle’’
hypothesis. There is indeed experimental evidence that even very
small quantities of infectious material may trigger infection in mice
[13,28], and this hypothesis was previously used in assessing
decontamination procedures[29]. However, we adopted a more
conservative risk estimate.
The duration of the infectious period of CJD is unknown but
could be very long. We used as a reference the incubation period
Table 1. The 10 components considered in the estimation of risk of iatrogenic sCJD transmission.
..................................................................................................................................................
Risk component Ranges used in the model References
1. Brain infectivity BI 10
7–10
9 human intracerebral
ID50/g of brain tissue
From expert consensus based on Brown’s unpublished data (2000)
[25,37]
2. Brain infectivity to pulp infectivity ratio BPR 10
23–10
24 From experimental data in non-human primates infected with sCJD
[11].
3. Mass remaining on endodontic instruments
after cleaning
M 2.5–316 mg Experimental data on procedures for decontamination of dental
instruments in the UK [21]
4. Agent infectivity reduction by autoclaving AIR 10
23–10
25 [25]
5. Fraction of remaining material that detaches
from instrument and inoculates the next patient
FM 1–10% of remaining mass M As a working hypothesis in [25]
6. Total number of times of a single endodontic
instrument is used
U 8–10 times From expert consultation [25]
7. Number of distinct instruments used throughout
the endodontic treatment of a tooth
N 6 From expert consultation [25] and oral personal communication
from Pr Kleinfinger, Association Dentaire Franc ¸aise
8. Duration of infectious period in sCJD patients DI 0.8–16 years DI was taken as last 40% of the incubation period [38], which varies
from 2 to 40 years [30]
9. Incidence of sCJD in the general population IGP 0.8–2.2 cases/million/year EuroCJD data for 2004 [5]
10. Frequency of endodontic treatment in the
general population
ETGP 0.11–0.13 procedures/year/
person
Personal communication from Pr Lo ¨st, European Society of
Endodontics, epidemiological data [22,23]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001330.t001
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easier, and for want of better or more recent evidence, the
duration of the infectious period relative to incubation was the
same as in the HPA report, i.e. 40% of the incubation period [25].
Our risk assessment should have used the prevalence of
infectious sCJD in those undergoing ET instead of that in the
general population. Presumably, the former is the largest and the
risk was therefore minimized. Indeed, children, who do not
develop sCJD are taken into account in the general population
estimate, when that in ET patients concerns only adults.
The ranges of values of risk assessment generated with our
model were broad. They mirror the current lack of knowledge and
the uncertainties concerning data and hypotheses. However, our
model makes it clear that the ET of the 20
th century were not risk-
free in terms of CJD. Therefore, our model suggests that patients
may well have been contaminated at the end of 20
th century, and
still be in the latency period and at risk of transmitting the disease.
The estimated individual risk of sCJD transmission during ET
was low in our assessment. However, these values compared with
the mortality rates in general anaesthesia [31], transcutaneous
Figure 2. Individual risk assessment of sCJD transmission during ET, using dose–effects functions Q1 ( blue) and Q2 ( green). A: median (vertical
line within the box), the 95% CI (T bars), and the 25
th–75
th percentiles (left and right borders of the box). B: risks of iatrogenic mortality associated
with other procedures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001330.g002
Figure 3. Population risk assessment of sCJD transmission during ET, using dose–effects functions Q1 ( blue) and Q2 ( green). See the legend to
figure 2 for the description of the box plots. The vertical line passing through both plots is the epidemic threshold (R.1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001330.g003
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in the modern health care.
We also studied the possible impact of ET at a population level
and showed that there was a high probability that the
reproduction rate R exceeded 1 in the absence of effective prion
decontamination of the instruments: one of the conditions for the
initiation of an epidemic process is fulfilled. To date, epidemio-
logical surveillance data did not evidence such an epidemic
process. However, would our hypothesis be true, the increase in
incidence could remain modest and hard to identify for dozens of
years because the incidence of sCJD is low, the incubation period
long and in competition with all mortality causes present. CJD
surveillance systems is too recent to show such trends.
Vacuum autoclaving and porous-load autoclaving for 18 min at
134uC are currently recognised as appropriate methods for prion
decontamination, leading to a reduction of the infectivity load by
of 3–5 log10 or more. According to our model, this decontami-
nation would prevent CJD transmission in dental practice, even
considering that the residual infectivity is not strictly reduced to
zero. These methods are recommended in official reports in
various countries. However, in a US study conducted in 1996 [34],
only 53% of dentists used autoclaves to decontaminate root-canal
files. In a survey conducted in France in 2004, only 79% of dentists
used an autoclave [35]. The problem of correct use of the
autoclaves and regular checking of their efficacy has also been
raised by many authors in several countries [34]. A recent survey
on dental practice also showed that other elementary precaution-
ary measures against CJD transmission were not widely respected.
For example, the vast majority of dentists did not actively seek out
patients at-risk for any form of CJD (sporadic, iatrogenic or
familial) [36]. Therefore, in the current situation and despite
recommended decontamination procedures, the risk of sCJD
transmission during dental care might still not be zero. In any case,
our findings constitute a strong argument for the strict respect of
the official recommendations on decontamination procedures in
dentistry, and even suggest that the cost-benefit of single-use
endodontic instruments should be re-evaluated.
The risk analysis approach we have used relies on a ‘‘problem
dissection’’ in which all components to a risk are identified and
linked to the available scientific data, knowledge, and expert
opinion. It may be of help in other emerging diseases, when data
on the natural history of the disease and transmission are still
scarce and clinical events cannot be observed directly. In all these
cases, the output of the work will always be questionable, because
of the lack of data, but the strength of the method is that its results
and final statements are refutable as data accrues.
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